Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U.S. 211 (2002)
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization Et. Al., 307 U.S. 496 (59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939)
United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 36454 L.Ed. 2d 376 (1977)
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization Et. Al., 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1979)
Cannon v. University Chicago Et. Al., 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979)
Patsy v. Board Regents State Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982)
Merrill Lynch v. Curran Et Al., 456 U.S. 353, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457 (1982)
Insurance Corporation Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492, 50 U.S.L.W. 4553 (1982)
Matt T. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company America, 128 L.Ed.2d 391, 62 U.S.L.W. 4313 (1994)
AND FOR THE RECORD, "'CAUSE I SAY SO" IS NEITHER JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY.
YOU CAN CATCH A DEAD FISH WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTIONAL HOOK.
A "jurisdictional hook" is a "'provision in a federal statute that requires the government to establish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal
jurisdiction in connection with any individual application of the statute.'" United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting
United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 1999)), overruled on
other grounds by Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), as recognized in
United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 2008).
The jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into in every other court when the proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities.
They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal.
They constitute no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers. [and perverts with bad judgement.] " Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U.S. 1 Pet. 328 328 (1828)
Here’s a hypo: assume a defendant hires a Las Vegas killer to murder the defendant’s wife in Reno, but the defendant never knows how the hitman plans to travel. If the hitman drives straight north on I-95 through Death Valley (staying in Nevada), the defendant is guilty, if at all, of some state offense only.
If the hitman gets a cheap Southwest flight from Vegas to San Francisco, though, and then drives a rental car to Reno – then the defendant has committed a federal crime. The defendant must induce the hitman to travel to murder, and (whether known to the defendant or not) the murderer must travel interstate, to satisfy the federal statute.
The was the law, and had always been the law...until our case.
After our case, things went back to normal. once again the government has the burden to establish and had to prove travel across state lines, to assume power.
U.S. v. Alderman, No. 07-30186 (5-12-09). The 9th holds that the sale of body armor in interstate commerce creates a sufficient nexus between possessing the body armor and commerce to allow for congressional commerce clause authority. The majority (McKeown joined by B. Fletcher) feel that they have to follow the Supremes precedent in Scarborough v. U.S., 31 US 563 (1977) (firearm that travels interstate provides nexus) and 9th Circuit precedent in U.S. v. Cortes, 299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002). The majority acknowledges the tension in the changing commerce clause jurisprudence, citing Morrison and Lopez. However, the statute closely tracks the one in Scarborough, and that the requirement that the body armor is sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce is sufficient. Dissenting, Paez argues that precedent does not control post-Lopez, because the connection to interstate commerce for possession by a felon is too attenuated. Section 931 requires no showing by the government that body armor involved a commercial transaction, substantially affected interstate travel, a crime, or possession of a firearm. There must be some connection, otherwise, as Paez argues here, mere intrastate possession of body armor by a felon not part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme and not connected to crime that affects interstate commerce, provides an insufficient commerce clause basis. The deficiency requires reversal.
Congress criminalized the possession of body armor by "violent felons." See 18 USC § 931. Within which of Supreme Court's three categories of federal Commerce Clause power does this statute fall?
Trick question -- turns out that the body armor statute is authorized by that that elusive "fourth" category of Commerce Clause power, explains the Ninth in a disappointing decision (sparking a powerful Paez dissent). United States v. Alderman, __ F.3d __, 2009 WL 1298056 (May 12, 2009), decision available here.
See ABA Task Force on Federalization of Criminal Law, Report,
(1998) (reprinted in 11 Fed. Senten. Rptr. 194 (1999)) (“The Task Force
concluded that the evidence demonstrated a recent dramatic increase in the
number and variety of federal crimes. Although it may be impossible to
determine exactly how many federal crimes could be prosecuted today, it
is clear that of all federal crimes enacted since 1865, over forty percent
have been created since 1970 . . . . [M]uch of the recent increase in federal
criminal legislation significantly overlaps crimes traditionally prosecuted
by the states.”).
Look, you know you have to look, there! ABOVE!! It's "a person, on the left," and "the person of another," on the right. Do you understand? No? Still Baffled? Click image below for the answer to the question, "What is a person and what is the difference between a person and the person of another?"
"It
is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should.
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because
it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it
by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before
us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction,
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur
which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can
do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously perform our
duty." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264 (1821)
In a similar case to Killercop's, a guy named Marks filed several pretrial motions in which he moved to dismiss the case against him
for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The court
denied the motions without a hearing, just as above.
Here is why the courts [judges] ignored the [jurisdiction] challenge in the above cases, spanning a period of at least twenty years that we now know of, in America.
The MARKS court said:
"Marks argues that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the prosecution and lacked personal jurisdiction
over him because the government failed to meet its burden
of establishing jurisdiction once Marks challenged it."
Just as in the case above:
"Marks also argue[d] that the district court committed reversible
error because it summarily denied Marks’ challenges to the
court’s jurisdiction without holding a hearing."
A DISCUSSION OF A BURDEN:
The
burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party
invoking federal jurisdiction. See Daimler Chrysler v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d
1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000). That means the government actors.
OKAY, SO LETS SEE SOME BURDEN, SHALL WE?
"We review de novo a district court’s assumption of jurisdiction.
United States v. Bennett, 147 F.3d 912, 913 (9th Cir.
1998); see United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 666 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“Jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo[.]”).
WOW, A "REVIEW DE NOVO," THAT HARDLY SEEMS A BURDEN, YET. RIGHT?
"We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision
whether to hold a hearing on a motion. See United States
v. Hernandez, 424 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (motion
to suppress); United States v. Bussel, 414 F.3d 1048, 1054
(9th Cir. 2005) (motion for a new trial); United States v.
Smith, 282 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (motion to substitute
counsel); United States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1065
(9th Cir. 1998) (motion to dismiss indictment)."
[t]he district court had personal jurisdiction
over Marks "by virtue" of Marks’ having been brought
before it on a federal indictment charging a violation of federal
law. See United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1326
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655, 659-70 (1992)); see also United States v. Lussier,
929 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1991)
(“It is well settled that
a district court has personal jurisdiction over any party who
appears before it, regardless of how his appearance was
obtained.”); United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684 n.8
(9th Cir. 1980) (same).[12] Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by not holding a hearing on Marks’ motions contesting the
court’s jurisdiction. Marks’ jurisdictional challenges were frivolous.
IMAGINE THAT:
YOU DON'T HAVE TO MEET ANY BURDEN OR HOLD ANY HEARING, AND YOU GET TO DISMISS IT WITHOUT ANSWERING THE CHALLENGE, BY NOT MEETING IT OR RECOGNIZING IT.
HARDLY SEEM LIKE MUCH OF A BURDEN TO ME. OR DUE PROCESS TO REDRESS ONE'S GRIEVANCES. BUT I'M NO EXPERT.
ANYONE KNOW ANY?
LOGIC FOLLOWS THAT ONCE YOU ARE IN THEIR POSSESSION AS THEIR PROPERTY AND SLAVE, YOU CAN'T CHALLENGE THE LAW(S) BEING IMPOSED AND BEING USED TO SUBJECT YOU TO SLAVERY.
ARMED WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE, AMERICA, YOU NOW KNOW THAT THE ONLY DUE PROCESS THE LAW ALLOWS TO CHALLENGE THEIR (NOT YOUR) JURISDICTION, IS AT THE POINT OF A GUN.
We live in oppressive times. We have, as a nation, become our own thought police; but instead of calling the process by which we limit our expression of dissent and wonder "censorship," we call it "concern for commercial viability."
Due Process is a course of legal proceedings according to rules and principles that have been established in a system for jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. Due Process derives from early English Common Law. The first concrete expression of the Due Process idea embraced by Anglo-American law appeared in the 39th Article of Magna Carta 1215. (Encyc. Brit.)
The Rule of Law is the supremacy of law and embodies three concepts:
3 and the fact that the citizen's personal freedoms are formulated and protected by the ordinary law. (Oxford Ref. Dictionary of Law).
Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven." (Jagens v. Lavine, 415 S.Ct.768). "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination." (Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910). "Where there is an absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct collateral attack." (Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 382; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471).