• Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)
  • Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U.S. 211 (2002)
  • McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)
  • Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization Et. Al., 307 U.S. 496 (59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939)
  • United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 36454 L.Ed. 2d 376 (1977)
  • Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization Et. Al., 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1979)
  • Cannon v. University Chicago Et. Al., 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979)
  • Patsy v. Board Regents State Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982)
  • Merrill Lynch v. Curran Et Al., 456 U.S. 353, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457 (1982)
  • Insurance Corporation Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492, 50 U.S.L.W. 4553 (1982)
  • Matt T. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company America, 128 L.Ed.2d 391, 62 U.S.L.W. 4313 (1994)

    AND FOR THE RECORD, "'CAUSE I SAY SO" IS NEITHER JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY.

    YOU CAN CATCH A DEAD FISH WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTIONAL HOOK.

    A "jurisdictional hook" is a "'provision in a federal statute that requires the government to establish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction in connection with any individual application of the statute.'" United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 1999)), overruled on other grounds by Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), as recognized in United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 2008).

    Similarly, in United States v. Killercop, we held that an identical jurisdictional hook in 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) was satisfied where the "[d]efendant electronically sent threats and social security numbers to internet servers located across state lines." 505 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2007). In that case, the government presented evidence that the defendant's website, which contained the threats, was uploaded to various servers located in multiple states.

    THE BIG KOZINSKI

  • The claim is brought pursuant to R.S. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

    'Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.'

    challenge

  • If the defendant challenges the truth of the factual assertions, the court will consider evidence outside the pleading and impose on the plaintiff the burden of demonstrating the facts asserted to warrant federal jurisdiction.  Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1018 (2005).  See 2 J. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice - Civil section 12-30 (2010).  

     

    Prez

     

    "Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide any question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgments, until reversed, are regarded as binding in every other court. Except...

    The jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into in every other court when the proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities.

    They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal.

    They constitute no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers. [and perverts with bad judgement.] " Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U.S. 1 Pet. 328 328 (1828)


  • "Take a strong stand and uphold the true heart of your agreement with honesty and no playing with the words. Monitor your agreement and keep an open mind for the right solution to all situations. Don't give too much because your jurisdiction is precious." Give too much and you will lose it one way by showing that you're incompetent or the other way that you're not cooperating. There is two sides, walk in the middle." ~~Twila WhiteBear


    A WISE GUY

    Here’s a hypo: assume a defendant hires a Las Vegas killer to murder the defendant’s wife in Reno, but the defendant never knows how the hitman plans to travel. If the hitman drives straight north on I-95 through Death Valley (staying in Nevada), the defendant is guilty, if at all, of some state offense only.

    If the hitman gets a cheap Southwest flight from Vegas to San Francisco, though, and then drives a rental car to Reno – then the defendant has committed a federal crime. The defendant must induce the hitman to travel to murder, and (whether known to the defendant or not) the murderer must travel interstate, to satisfy the federal statute.

    The was the law, and had always been the law...until our case.

    After our case, things went back to normal. once again the government has the burden to establish and had to prove travel across state lines, to assume power.

    But not in out case, Why? Ask the Wizard Of Koz.


    Tuesday, May 12, 2009

    U.S. v. Alderman, No. 07-30186 (5-12-09). The 9th holds that the sale of body armor in interstate commerce creates a sufficient nexus between possessing the body armor and commerce to allow for congressional commerce clause authority. The majority (McKeown joined by B. Fletcher) feel that they have to follow the Supremes precedent in Scarborough v. U.S., 31 US 563 (1977) (firearm that travels interstate provides nexus) and 9th Circuit precedent in U.S. v. Cortes, 299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002). The majority acknowledges the tension in the changing commerce clause jurisprudence, citing Morrison and Lopez. However, the statute closely tracks the one in Scarborough, and that the requirement that the body armor is sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce is sufficient. Dissenting, Paez argues that precedent does not control post-Lopez, because the connection to interstate commerce for possession by a felon is too attenuated. Section 931 requires no showing by the government that body armor involved a commercial transaction, substantially affected interstate travel, a crime, or possession of a firearm. There must be some connection, otherwise, as Paez argues here, mere intrastate possession of body armor by a felon not part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme and not connected to crime that affects interstate commerce, provides an insufficient commerce clause basis. The deficiency requires reversal.

    Sunday, May 17, 2009

    Case o' The Week: Like Nigel's "Up to 11" -- Alderman and the "Fourth Category" Of Commerce Clause Power

    Congress criminalized the possession of body armor by "violent felons." See 18 USC § 931. Within which of Supreme Court's three categories of federal Commerce Clause power does this statute fall?

    Trick question -- turns out that the body armor statute is authorized by that that elusive "fourth" category of Commerce Clause power, explains the Ninth in a disappointing decision (sparking a powerful Paez dissent). United States v. Alderman, __ F.3d __, 2009 WL 1298056 (May 12, 2009), decision available here.


    See ABA Task Force on Federalization of Criminal Law, Report, (1998) (reprinted in 11 Fed. Senten. Rptr. 194 (1999)) (“The Task Force concluded that the evidence demonstrated a recent dramatic increase in the number and variety of federal crimes. Although it may be impossible to determine exactly how many federal crimes could be prosecuted today, it is clear that of all federal crimes enacted since 1865, over forty percent have been created since 1970 . . . . [M]uch of the recent increase in federal criminal legislation significantly overlaps crimes traditionally prosecuted by the states.”).

    "ONLY ONE TRIBUNAL EVER ADOPTED A PRACTICE OF FORCING COUNSEL UPON AN UNWILLING DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING. THE TRIBUNAL WAS THE STAR CHAMBER." U.S. v FARETTA , 422 US 806 (1975)

    OUTSIDE IT'S AMERICA.

    WHAT WOULD BE THE CAPACITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OF THE COURTS TO SUPRESS THIS KIND OF SPEECH?" --Judge A. Howard Matz, PRE-TRIAL OF KILLERCOP

    A FRAUD UPON THE COURT

    Jurisdiction

    Ignore the man behind the curtain!

     

    SEE ALSO: Pre-Pre-Trial, Pre-Trial, and Trial.

    In the video below you can listen to Sung Park, from the Federal Public Pretenders Office, forced on Killercop by the Ninth Circuit, for one purpose, to help grab the jurisdiction of the Internet in the Ninth Circuit, inter alia.

    There was no proof killercop "transmitted" any pages at all. Yet Sung Park falsely confessed Killercop was guilty.

    Why? >>>>>>>BIG HINT!

    Why did California District judge Matz disgrace the robe by changing the entire meaning of a law?

    Maybe he didn't get enough of a pound of flesh from the "treatment" he "subject"[ed] killercop to earlier?

    Maybe Matz and his buddy, the Wizard of Koz, were too busy trading porn.

    Time for restoration!!!

    Sounds like a frivolus waste of the time.

    NO VIDEO ABOVE? CLICK HERE.


    "It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction, which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously perform our duty." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264 (1821)


     

    A Jurisdictional Challenge, Filed, Before The Trial, And Ignored By Lord Matz


    Another Jurisdiction Challenge Ignored

    By Lord Matz


     

    Jurisdiction ignored by the appeal attorney, one of many whom the court forced on Killercop.

     

    Why would the Ninth Circuit allow such blatant conflict of interest to stand on a first appeal? Ask the judge. He knows, as do the other players.

    So will you, if you connect the dots. It was always about the jurisdiction, and that's the end of it.


    In a similar case to Killercop's, a guy named Marks filed several pretrial motions in which he moved to dismiss the case against him for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The court denied the motions without a hearing, just as above.

     

    Here is why the courts [judges] ignored the [jurisdiction] challenge in the above cases, spanning a period of at least twenty years that we now know of, in America.

     

    The MARKS court said:

    "Marks argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the prosecution and lacked personal jurisdiction over him because the government failed to meet its burden of establishing jurisdiction once Marks challenged it."

     

    Just as in the case above:

     

    "Marks also argue[d] that the district court committed reversible error because it summarily denied Marks’ challenges to the court’s jurisdiction without holding a hearing."

    I AM BLINDED BY THE BURDEN

    A DISCUSSION OF A BURDEN:

    The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party invoking federal jurisdiction. See Daimler Chrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000). That means the government actors.

     

    I AM BLINDED BY THE BURDEN

    OKAY, SO LETS SEE SOME BURDEN, SHALL WE?

     

    "We review de novo a district court’s assumption of jurisdiction. United States v. Bennett, 147 F.3d 912, 913 (9th Cir. 1998); see United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo[.]”).

     

    I AM BLINDED BY THE BURDENWOW, A "REVIEW DE NOVO," THAT HARDLY SEEMS A BURDEN, YET.

     

    "We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision whether to hold a hearing on a motion. See United States v. Hernandez, 424 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (motion to suppress); United States v. Bussel, 414 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (motion for a new trial); United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (motion to substitute counsel); United States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998) (motion to dismiss indictment)."

     

    I AM BLINDED BY THE BURDENAGAIN, THAT HARDLY SEEMS A BURDEN, YET. LOTS OF REVIEWING, BUT NOT MUCH BURDEN.

     

    HERE IS HOW THE COURT IN THE MARKS CASE MET IT"S "BURDEN":

     

    JURISDICTION BY "VIRTUE"

    [t]he district court had personal jurisdiction
    over Marks "by virtue" of Marks’ having been brought before it on a federal indictment charging a violation of federal law. See United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659-70 (1992)); see also United States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1991)

     

    (“It is well settled that a district court has personal jurisdiction over any party who appears before it, regardless of how his appearance was obtained.”); United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684 n.8
    (9th Cir. 1980) (same).[12] Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a hearing on Marks’ motions contesting the court’s jurisdiction. Marks’ jurisdictional challenges were frivolous.

    IMAGINE THAT:

    No means No

    YOU DON'T HAVE TO MEET ANY BURDEN OR HOLD ANY HEARING, AND YOU GET TO DISMISS IT WITHOUT ANSWERING THE CHALLENGE, BY NOT MEETING IT OR RECOGNIZING IT.

     

    HARDLY SEEM LIKE MUCH OF A BURDEN TO ME. OR DUE PROCESS TO REDRESS ONE'S GRIEVANCES. BUT I'M NO EXPERT.

    ANYONE KNOW ANY?


    LOGIC FOLLOWS THAT ONCE YOU ARE IN THEIR POSSESSION AS THEIR PROPERTY AND SLAVE, YOU CAN'T CHALLENGE THE LAW(S) BEING IMPOSED AND BEING USED TO SUBJECT YOU TO SLAVERY.

     

    ARMED WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE, AMERICA, YOU NOW KNOW THAT THE ONLY DUE PROCESS THE LAW ALLOWS TO CHALLENGE THEIR (NOT YOUR) JURISDICTION, IS AT THE POINT OF A GUN.

     

    WHAT DO YOU THINK?


    >We live in oppressive times. We have, as a nation, become our own thought police; but instead of calling the process by which we limit our expression of dissent and wonder "censorship," we call it "concern for commercial viability."

    U.S. v. Lopez

    LOPEZ IN ENGLISH

    THE BOTTOM LINE:

    TOTAL DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS MEANS WAR.

    UNLESS I CHANGE THE MEANING.

    Due Process is a course of legal proceedings according to rules and principles that have been established in a system for jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. Due Process derives from early English Common Law. The first concrete expression of the Due Process idea embraced by Anglo-American law appeared in the 39th Article of Magna Carta 1215. (Encyc. Brit.)

    The Rule of Law is the supremacy of law and embodies three concepts: the absolute predominance of regular law, so that the government has no arbitrary authority over the citizen; the equal subjection of all (including officials) to the ordinary courts; and the fact that the citizen's personal freedoms are formulated and protected by the ordinary law. (Oxford Ref. Dictionary of Law).

    Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven." (Jagens v. Lavine, 415 S.Ct.768). "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination." (Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910). "Where there is an absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct collateral attack." (Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 382; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471).

     

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