FACIALLY LAWFUL SINCE 1998
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MAYDAY IN AMERICA! SECRET THINGS CRIME SCENE NUTS AND EXTREMISTS
c

Judge Matz was very, very careful to not use the words of the law [No, 'person of another,' and [transmit]] to the jury.

"The district court must formulate jury instructions so that they fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, correctly state the law, and are not misleading." Abromson v. American Pac. Corp., 114 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Mockler v. Multnomah County, 140 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of transmission in interstate commerce. United States v. Oxendine, 531 F.2d 957 (1976)

 

And Judge Howard Matz knew, at this point of the trial, that the government had produced no proof of an element of the crime to establish jurisdiction of a transmission across a state line (interstate), rendering the case a state Tenth Amendment issue.

His only choice was to dismiss the case before it even went to a jury. The law required it. But hey, the law required them to not commit fraud, but who's following the law anymore, not these guys!

 

 

"[Killercop] is accused of transmitting a threat in interstate or foreign commerce."

Title 18: 875(c), as presently drafted, applies to pure speech; it imposes a criminal penalty of up to 5 years of imprisonment, plus a fine, for the mere utterance or writing of what is, or may be perceived as, a true statement of fact—without anything
more. 875(c) is so broadly drafted, the government is not required to prove anything before the district court.

A WISE GUY

Neither the government or I dispute that the Act "seek[s] to regulate 'only . . . words.' " Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972)).

875(c) therefore concerns me because of its potential for setting a precedent whereby the government may proscribe speech solely because it is called true, While lies go free.

This rule the government would urge you to apply in order to uphold 875(c) would, if left unchecked, significantly enlarge the scope of existing categorical exceptions to First
Amendment protection. All previous circumstances in which speech has been found proscribable involve not just speech, but additional elements that serve to narrow what speech may be punished, like time and place and manner.

Indeed, 875(c) is unconstitutional in that it's nature is selective, in that only the government can say if it is true.
Like saying you are a witch. You are then left to prove otherwise.

The sad fact is, governments become corrupted, and power over speech is the most dangerous to give any branch. Which is why it was forbidden and placed off bounds under the very First Amendmet under the Bill of Rights.

Perhaps, in context, many of these threats are within the local government's legitimate reach. But the Federal government cannot decide that some speech or "any" type of speech may not be said, without a reviewing court's undertaking a thoughtful analysis
of the constitutional concerns raised by such government interference with speech.

Finding no appropriate way to avoid the First Amendment question I pose, I hold that the speech proscribed by
875(c) is not sufficiently confined to fit among any categories of speech previously held to be beyond the
First Amendment's protective sweep.

I apply strict scrutiny review to 875(c), and hold it unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored enough to achieving a compelling Federal governmental interest, and it is vague and overbroad, and because No means No.

 

 

"Only one tribunal that ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was the Star Chamber." U.S. v Faretta, 422 US 806 (1975)

OUTSIDE IT'S AMERICA.

"What would be the capacity of law enforcement and of the courts to SUPRESS this kind of SPEECH?" -Judge A. Howard Matz, PRE-TRIAL HEARING OF KILLERCOP

FAKE NEWS - LIAR

Epic corruption exposes the secret trial of Killercop.com.

ANOTHER PERSONPERSON OF ANOTHER

Look, you know you have to look, there!! ABOVE!! It's "another person, on the left," and "the person of another," person, on the right.

STILL BAFFFLED?

WIKI

WOUNDED WIKI

CENSORED WIKI

FACEBOOK AND THE TWITTER

YOUTUBE

MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES)

Threats.

Interstate Transmission Of Threat to Injure. 18 USC § 875(c)

SOURCE: JUDGE D. BROCK HORNBY’S 2008 REVISIONS TO PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS


Interstate Transmission Of Threat Injure 18 USC § 875(c)

 

Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c), makes it a Federal crime or offense for anyone to knowingly and willfully transmit in interstate commerce or foreign commerce a threat to... injure someone. The Defendant can be found guilty of that offense only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

 

First: That the Defendant sent or transmitted in [interstate] [foreign] commerce a communication containing a true threat [to injure the person of another], but not another person, as charged;

 

SOURCE: ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 2003

Interstate Transmission Of Threat.

Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions

 

The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with transmitting a threat ... In order for the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, the defendant transmitted in interstate or foreign commerce a communication containing any threat...

A WISE GUY

"We must be mindful of the "precise" language Congress used to describe the illegal conduct." ~Ninth Circuit District Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw

 

Gee, did Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions mean any communication? Nope.

"Any" only means "any" when anyone in the government says it means any. 'Cause words don't matter any more.

 

Notice they didn't say anything above about using a facility, or instrumentality, of Interstate commerce. So it must be only in Interstate commerce, not about effecting. Which is tons more then plain ol' Intrastate. Too bad the government has neither. Looks like they will have to pull out the "infer" and/or "thus" card, from the botom of the deck. Especially since the law doen't apply to "any threat" as they thus and infer, but specifically to "the person of another," to prevent any person(s) from hearing the threat against the related person from that person, like a baby. It doesn't protect the willing listener from a threat against their own person. Unless the person is a captive, making the threat imminent. And Intranet in the nature.

Whether an objective or subjective test is used to determine if a communication constitutes a true threat is not settled law in the Ninth Circuit, see United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 961-62 (9th Cir.2007) (recognizing conflict in Ninth Circuit case law); United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1016-18 (9th Cir.2005) (same), although other circuits apply an objective test, see United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 304-05 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Koski, 424 F.3d 812, 817 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir.2004); United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir.2004).

My crime charged was a "specific intent" crime. However, during my trial the instruction given to the jury was: "if a reasonable person would foresee that the statement [made by the defendant] would be interpreted by [the recipient] as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm …"

"In Roy we confronted the question of whether 18 U.S.C. Sec. 871 required a showing of specific intent to threaten. Section 871, which makes it unlawful inter alia to "knowingly and willfully" threaten the President of the United States, is a companion section to Secs. 875(c) and 876. After scrutinizing the possible purposes underlying Sec. 871, we concluded that no actual intent to threaten must be shown. We held that culpability could be established by showing that "a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by [the recipient] as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President...." Roy, 416 F.2d at 877. We can imagine no clearer description of an objective, general intent showing."

 

 

ALEX KOZINSKI COMMITS AND COVERED UP CRIMES

THEY ALL IGNORED THEIR OATHS, THE FACTS, THE RULES THE LAW AND THE 5TH AND 6TH AMENDMENTS AND PROCEEDED FORWARD WITH THE SELECTIVVE PERSECUTION IN A SECRET HEARING.

 

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A COVER UP BY JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI.

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