Advisory Counsel.

03.01.2004 Reed began as Advisory Counsel, but judge calls him Standby Counsel.

1.08.2003, Reed announced self as Advisory Counsel, all through the trial, afterJudge told jury Reed was Standby Counsel.

11.07.2003 Reed starts off as Advisory Counsel and becomes Standby Counsel.

10.21.2003 Reed is listed as Standby Counsel but appears as Advisory Counsel.

10.09.2003, Docket #251 judge ORDERED that Advisory Counsel David R. Reed…

Although a defendant may choose to allocate his defense to an attorney, "to thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish ... violates the logic of the Amendment."

"Unless the accused has acquiesed in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense."

Court directed activity by the attorney such as calling the judge's attention to matters,-could constitute an even more serious infringement of the right.

"Only one tribunal ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was the Star Chamber." -U.S. v Faretta , 422 U.S. 806 (1975)


When speech is compelled, additional damage is done. Individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions.

Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning. -Thomas Jefferson




Look, you know you have to look, there! ABOVE!! It's "a person, on the left," and "the person of another," on the right. Do you understand? No? Still Baffled? Click image below for the answer to the question, "What is a person and what is the difference between a person and the person of another?"









All Rights Reserved.





Transcript of 04.15.2004 (SB) 5
Transcript of 03.01.2004 (BOTH) 5
Transcript of 12.04.2003 (SB) 6
Transcript of 11.12.2003 (Trial Day 1) (BOTH) 6
Transcript of 11.07.2003 (Advisory) 7
Docket 271 on 10.28.2003 8
Transcript of 10.21.2003 (Advisory) 9
Docket #251 on 10.09.2003 (Advisory) 9
Docket # 246 on 10.07.2003 (SB) 9
Transcript of 10.01.2003 (COUNSEL) 9
Transcript of 09.26.2003 (SB-Removed) 10
Docket # 224 on 09.24.2003 (SB) 11
Transcript of 09.02.2003 (SB) 11

NOTE: Prior to the Sentencing Hearing, David Reed didn’t refer to himself as “Standby Counsel” It was always Advisory Counsel, after he asked to be removed as trial counsel. See also Nicolaysen Motion to Withdraw.


On 04.15.2004 Reed announces himself as Standby Counsel

03.01.2004 Reed began as Advisory Counsel, but judge calls him Standby Counsel.

1.08.2003, Reed announced self as Advisory Counsel, all through the trial, afterJudge told jury Reed was Standby Counsel.

11.07.2003 Reed starts off as Advisory Counsel and becomes Standby Counsel.

10.21.2003 Reed is listed as Standby Counsel but appears as Advisory Counsel.

10.09.2003, Docket #251 judge ORDERED that Advisory Counsel David R. Reed…

10.07.2003, Docket #246 Reed is relieved of duties as full counsel and reappointed as Standby Counsel as defendant waived right to full counsel.

10.01.2003 Reed appears as Standby Counsel and made Full Counsel

09.24.2003 See Docket # 224. Request by Prosecutor, that defendant’s Standby Counsel be appointed to represent defendant.

09.02.2003 Brennan becomes Standby Counsel Reed becomes Standby Counsel.

08.27.2003 The Competency Challenge

The role of standby counsel is limited to technical assistance.“ The utility of assigning stand-by counsel to pro se litigants is to assist them with the technical complexities inherent in the law and in trying a case,” U.S. v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146, 1160 (11th Cir. 1995); cert. denied Wright v. U.S., 517 U.S. 1149 (1996); appeal after remand for resentencing,

Standby counsel may “call the judge’s attention to matters favorable to the accused upon which the judge should rule on his or her motion.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-3.7 (2d ed. 1980), cited in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944, 951 at n. 10 (1984).

Standby counsel may assist the defendant in routine procedural or evidentiary matters in furtherance of the defendant’s clearly indicated goals, such as the introduction of evidence, objection to testimony, or matters of courtroom protocol. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944, 953 - 954 (1984).

Standby counsel must be available if and when the accused requests help. United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018 – 1019 (3rd Cir. 1993). Where a pro se defendant has standby counsel, it may be assumed that he has adequate access to a library. United States v. Beckwith, 987 F.Supp. 1345, 1348 (D. Utah 1997).

Standby counsel is restricted in activity.
Since the case responsibility is limited, a standby attorney is actually restricted in his or her roles within the case. Standby counsel may not make significant tactical decisions, may not control the questioning of witnesses, and may not “speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944, 951 (1984).

Thus, standby counsel’s role is that of an “observer, an attorney who attends the proceeding and who may offer advice, but who does not speak for the defendant or bear responsibility for his defense.” United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991). Disagreements between the pro se defendant and standby counsel are to be resolved in the defendant’s favor whenever the decision is one that would normally be left to the discretion of counsel. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944, 951 (1984).

A pro se defendant may not insist on specific types of assistance from standby counsel. A defendant does not have a constitutional right to insist on “hybrid” representation, in which the defendant and standby counsel each serve as co-counsel. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944, 953 (1984)

A pro se defendant does not have the right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944, 954 (1984). By waiver of counsel, a pro se defendant has also waived the right to complain that his own self-defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 at n. 8 (1984); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 at n. 46 (1975); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1005 (1990); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1231 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Brown, 591 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1979).

The role of standby counsel is fundamentally different from full counsel duties. “There can be no question that the roles of standby counsel and full-fledged defense counsel are fundamentally different. The very definition of full-fledged counsel includes the proposition that the counselor, and not the accused, bears the responsibility for the defense; by contrast, the key limitation on standby counsel is that such counsel not be responsible--and not be perceived to be responsible--for the accused's defense.” Id. at 312. Thus, “(t)he legal role of standby counsel is ‘merely to be available in case the court determines that the defendant is no longer able to represent himself or in case the defendant chooses to consult an attorney.’” United States v. Vlahos, 884 F.Supp. 261, 264 (N.D. Ill. 1995), quoting United States v. Windsor, 981 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir.1992). Standby counsel should be willing to act to aid and assist defendant to the full extent reasonable and to fully assist defendant as time and circumstance allow and to act in a fully professional manner, but need not be available full time to respond immediately to every inquiry or request of defendant. See United States v. Beckwith. 987 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Utah 1997).

Pro se defendants may change their mind and request counsel.
The pro se defendant also retains the right to change his mind, “elevate standby counsel to a lead counsel role,” and waive his Faretta rights. United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1991) (district court erred in refusing to allow defendant to retract waiver of right to counsel). Indeed, “(o)nce a pro se defendant invites or agrees to any substantial participation by [standby] counsel, subsequent appearances by counsel must be presumed to be with the defendant's acquiescence, at least until the defendant expressly and unambiguously . . . request[s] that standby counsel be silenced.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944, 953 (1984); United States v. Willis, 970 F.2d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1992).

Standby counsel. An indigent criminal defendant who represents himself or herself has no right to court appointed standby advisory counsel. United States v. Salemo, 81 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 982 (1996). However, the court
may appoint standby counsel to protect the court’s interest in fair and orderly proceedings. Salemo, 81 F.3d at 1459 (citation omitted).

Often, as a matter of custom, if a Faretta motion is granted by the district court, appointed counsel will be asked to serve as advisory counsel to assist the defendant in the presentation of the defense. However, the unwanted, unsolicited participation of standby counsel in the presence of the jury may interfere with a defendant’s Faretta rights. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).

Appointment of Standby Counsel
When a person has waived representation by counsel, the judicial officer may appoint an attorney as "standby counsel" to protect the integrity and continuity of the proceedings.

Standby counsel appointed under the court’s inherent authority is not appointed under the CJA.

Instead, he or she serves as an expert or consultant to the court pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §3109, and does not represent the defendant. Cf. U.S. v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990). Such standby counsel may be appointed regardless of whether the defendant is financially able to obtain representation. Standby counsel also may be appointed to be available to assist with a pro se defendant’s defense. Only when such defendant is financially eligible, and counsel actually renders representation, may counsel be compensated under the CJA.
“If standby counsel’s participation over the defendant’s objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded.”
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984) (quoted in Lopez-Osuna, 232 F.3d at 665).

The appointment of standby counsel to represent the defendant does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se even if the appointment is made over the defendant’s objection. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)
Standby counsel cannot be allowed to take over the defendant’s case. The Sixth Amendment requires that a pro se defendant be allowed to control the organization and content of his or her defense. The defendant is to use the advice of standby counsel as he or she sees fit. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1989)
There is, however, no absolute bar on standby counsel’s unsolicited participation in the presentation of a pro se defendant’s case before the jury. Standby counsel may properly assist the pro se defendant before the jury in completing tasks the defendant clearly wishes to complete, such as introducing evidence and objecting to testimony. Standby counsel may also help ensure the defendant’s compliance with the basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure. However, standby counsel’s participation may not be so intrusive as to destroy the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself or herself. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)
Standby counsel is also permitted to participate in the presentation of a pro se defendant’s case outside the presence of a jury. However, the pro se defendant must be allowed to address the judge freely on his or her own behalf, and disputes between counsel and the pro se defendant must be resolved in the defendant’s favor in matters that are normally left to the discretion of counsel. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)
A defendant’s right of self-representation was violated by his exclusion from thirty bench conferences even though his standby counsel participated in the conferences. United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448 (10th Cir. 1995)
Standby counsel should be appointed to assist the defendant and to replace the defendant if the court determines during trial that the defendant can no longer be permitted to proceed pro se. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973) United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988) Standby counsel’s job is to assist the defendant in procedural matters the defendant is unfamiliar with and to facilitate a speedy and efficient trial by avoiding the delay often associated with pro se representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1986) United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1989)
Transcript of 04.15.2004 (SB)

Page 1, Lines 18-19
Reed: “Good afternoon, Your Honor. David Reed, Standby Counsel.

Transcript of 03.01.2004 (BOTH)

NOTE: Page 2 lists Reed as Stand-by Counsel
Page 4, Lines 18-19
Reed: “And good afternoon, Your Honor. David Reed, Advisory Counsel.

Page 25, Lines 10-14
Judge: “I appointed Mr. Reed to function as counsel for Mr. Sutcliffe for purposes of the sentencing hearing. I do that knowing that thus far Mr. Sutcliffe has been representing himself with Mr. Reed as Standby Counsel. ”

Page 27, Lines 6-10
“I didn’t ask to be made - - I didn’t ask to be made my own counsel. But if you’re going to make me my own counsel, I would at least hope that I would be treated as such. And I don’t feel I am even getting treated as such.”

Page 29, Lines 11-17
Judge: “But I do want you, Mr. Reed, under the applicable procedures, rules, and time sequences, certainly as to the legal issues, if any, that may be - - and I haven’t read the PSR - - I want you to file as an officer of the court, and in your capacity as standby counsel, a sentencing memorandum on behalf of Mr. Sutcliffe.” And he, Mr. Sutcliffe, can file his own as well.”

Transcript of 12.04.2003 (SB)
Docket #323

Page 2194, Lines 2-20
Judge: “Mr. Reed, I’m not going to relieve you of your duties as ‘standby counsel.’ I am requesting that you discuss with Mr. Sutcliffe whether he wants you to prepare the appropriate materials, or any materials, for purposes of sentencing. And if he agrees to have you do so, then I think it would be in his interests and I would prefer that you do so. I will allow you to confer with him about that aspect of the remaining part of the case. And whatever the signal is that Mr. – or statement is that Mr. Sutcliffe gives to you, just file a one-sentence status report with the – you don’t even have to do that. Just let the clerk know whether you have been engaged to handle the sentencing materials. Even if his decision is to not request you or authorize you to handle the materials or sentencing, I may do some research and determine whether that’s a right that he has. If he has that right, I’ll respect it. If not, I may require you to perform additional services for purposes of sentencing.”
Reed: “Yes, Your Honor.”
Judge: “That’s the way we’ll proceed on that.”

Transcript of 11.12.2003 (Trial Day 1) (BOTH)

Page 4, Lines 14-15
Reed: “Good morning, Your Honor, David Reed, advisory counsel.”

Page 40, Lines 7-9
Judge: “I have arranged for a standby counsel, Mr. David Reed, to be present…”

Page 41, Lines 10-12
Judge: “Are there any of you who believe that the decision that - - the fact, I should say, that Mr. Sutcliffe is representing himself…?”

Page 43, 11-15
Judge: “ Do you still think that the fact that Mr. Sutcliffe is not going to be represented by a lawyer except by this advisory or standby counsel, who will not be representing him but will merely be available, that that would prevent you from being fair?”

Page 107, Lines 10-13
Levine Juror: “Yes. The first one was child molestation. That came to a verdict. The second one was selling marijuana. That came to a verdict. The third one was a mugging. That was a hung jury.”

Page 109, Lines 19-23
Levine Juror: “And beyond what I have said, I don’t think there is anything else unless - - I don’t know whether this is pertinent or not. But in the first case, the first criminal case I was ever on, the defendant did not have a lawyer. He represented himself.”
Judge: “Okay. It’s obviously a different case. That was the child molestation case you told us about?”

Page 205, Lines 14-20
Judge: “What about - - I didn’t say public information. I said any information. Supposed somebody wanted to put down information about the addresses and social security numbers and employment information of the children of the prospective jurors sitting next to you and they hadn’t been given authorization to, would you think that that presents an issue of free speech?”

See Defendants OBJECTION TO ABOVE AT PAGE 211, LINES 11-25 to PAGE 212, LINES 1-5

Transcript of 11.07.2003 (Advisory)
Docket #280
Page 3, Lines 11-12
Reed: “Good morning, Your Honor, David Reed, advisory counsel.”

Page 37, Lines 14-18
Judge: “You will have the choice, if you want - - I’ll consider entertaining this choice - - of writing down the questions that you propose to ask Steven Sutcliffe in his capacity as a witness and have Mr. Reed, who will be stand-by counsel - - and I’ll be talking about his role an a minute - - “

Page 50, Lines 10-25
Judge: “Okay. Item 7 on the agenda is the role of Mr. Reed of stand-by counsel, who has an obligation that the court imposed and has been professional in carrying out. Mr. Reed, I want you to view the evidence that is presented at trial. The role of stand-by counsel, even if the client turns to stand-by counsel for any kind of assistance, is inherently limited and a person representing himself at trial doesn’t have the right to shift back and forth between proceeding through a lawyer and proceeding on his own during the course of any given trial. But you are available to respond to questions and courtroom procedures and logistical questions to provide some kind of logistical assistance, getting a refill of water, or anything else that Mr. Sutcliffe might request and that a lawyer might do. I don’t know what will happen in the course of this trail, but I want you to be prepared to view and be familiar –with the evidence as it’s being presented. It has not been your duty, and Mr. Sutcliffe’s letter made it very clear that he didn’t want you to exercise that duty, to determine what’s to be done with the evidence, what evidence to introduce, or anything else. That’s been established very clearly, including the letter that’s now been unsealed.”

Page 52, Lines 23
Defendant: “I filed a letter to you asking for reconsideration.”

Page 53, Lines 2-25
Defendant: “Okay. I also sent another letter also requesting clarification on the ruling regarding removal of Mr. Reed as appointed counsel based on several factors that the court had elicited from appointed counsel at the time. And I requested clarification on the reasoning behind that. Has the court reflected on the letter?
Judge: “Yes. I don’t think any clarification is necessary. The basis for my findings and statements and rulings concerning Mr. Reed and his status and relationship with you are sufficient and complete and I don’t intend to revisit that. Your motion for reconsideration on the allegations in the indictment I’ll tuen to in a couple of minutes.
Defendant: “I just want the record to reflect I object. I didn’t understand a word you just said there, Your Honor. I asked a very simple question in the letter, which was did you or did you not rely upon certain statements reflected from Mr. Reed as to your decision to remove him as counsel.
Judge: “Okay. This is the kind of thing that if it happened during the course of a ruling on an evidentiary objection would be totally inappropriate for you to do. You’re now arguing with me. I gave you an answer. I can’t ever be sure whether what I say to somebody is going to be comprehensible to that person, but the bottom line on this particular inquiry concerning Mr. Reed’s status is finished.”

Page 54, Lines 1-3
Judge: “It’s over. We’re not going over that ground again if you don’t understand what I ruled on before, I’m sorry, but I’m not going to go over that ground again.”

Page 63, Lines 12-25 deals with jurisdiction. See also page 72, Lines 1-14.

Page 68-69 deals with failure to inform the Grand Jury of specific intent.

Page 70-71 deals with sidebars.

Page 75-76 deals with the missing audio-tapes of Orly.

Docket 271 on 10.28.2003

See letter to judge dated Oct. 16, 2003, page 1-3
Defendant reminds judge of proper role of Standby Counsel under US .v Mills, 895 F.2d 897 (2nd Cir) cert. Denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990), Also involved denial of right to Compel Witnesses under Subpoena.

Transcript of 10.21.2003 (Advisory)

Page 2 list Reed as Standby Counsel
Page 3, Lines 14
Reed: “David Reed, Advisory Counsel.”
Page 50, Lines 8-13
Judge: “You don’t want Mr. Reed to be your lawyer. Right?”
Defendant: “He’s not my lawyer. He’s your counsel. I stressed that very closely in the letter to you and I cited U.S. v. Mills. He’s not my agent. Ye’s(sic) your agent.”
Judge: “Okay. Well, I think that’s sufficient basis to stop right here. I don’t think there is any need for Mr. Reed to respond. And the extent to which you and he had a difference of opinion as to whether an, if so, to what extent you’ve cooperated before, I relieved him in large measure as a result of your refusal to communicate with him.”

Docket #251 on 10.09.2003 (Advisory)

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Advisory Counsel David R. Reed, Esq. has approval to retain licensed investigator ARMANDO CRUZ in this matter.

Docket # 246 on 10.07.2003 (SB)

Reed is relieved of duties as full counsel and reappointed as Standby Counsel
Transcript of 10.01.2003 (COUNSEL)
Page 4, Lines 8-9
“Good morning, Your Honor. David Reed on behalf of Mr. Sutcliffe.”

Note: Further on down at the bottom of page 4, line 25, to Page 5, Line 1, Reed announces he is moving to withdraw from the case.

Page 33, Lines 14-25
Prosecutor: “I do know that when I spoke to Mr. Reed earlier about the case we talked about the possibility of going in I believe it was three or four weeks, and whether he could be ready. If he has represented to the court that he would be ready in three to four weeks, I think it’s well within the court’s discretion, absent even a motion from him and over the defendant’s objection, to exclude time in the interests of justice based on the need for defense preparation, knowing that defense counsel just got the evidence this past Monday. And even had he had it earlier, your Honor, he needed time to confer with his client about it.”

Page 34, Lines 1-8
Judge: “Okay. Well, I don’t think I have to be persuaded that neither Mr. Reed nor any other lawyer on such short notice would feel subjectively or objectively ready to proceed to trial n the short time frame that an October 7th trial would contemplate. I also don’t think that Mr. Sutcliffe would be ready, if he represents himself, because he has to have the evidence, maybe not all of it and maybe all of it.

Transcript of 09.26.2003 (SB-Removed)
Docket #236

Page 2, Lines13-14
Reed: “Good morning, Your Honor. David Reed, Standby Counsel.”
Page 3, Lines 2-4
Judge: “[t]hat the defense of Mr. Sutcliffe will be provided primarily by Mr. Sutcliffe with Mr. Reed serving as Standby Counsel…”

Page 20, Lines 9-20
Judge: “Now, I don’t think it is inappropriate for the record to note that I’ve previously authorized experts, or at least one expert, I don’t go back and check the file but at least one expert, and I think could have been more then one , somebody with specific skill and advanced skill in computer technology as well as to be appointed to represent or assist prior counsel. Have you seen any expert reports?”
Reed: “No. Not at all, Your Honor.”
Judge: “Has anybody discussed with you any of Mr. Sutcliffe’s prior lawyers, any expert reports that may have been generated?”
Reed: “No, Your Honor.”

Page 49, Lines 10-19
Judge: “Because I am utterly astonished, baffled, and upset that despite my efforts and orders that the material has not been transferred from one lawyer to the successive lawyer and is not in the current possession of the standby lawyer or the defendant.

Page 55, Lines 16-25
Judge: “Mr. Reed is in no position to provide even ‘stand by’ position that would be informed in terms of the evidence….[h]e doesn’t even have the evidence.” If you don’t waive any of your rights, we’ll go to trial a week later and I don’t think the speedy trial act will be violated, but you have to tell me what you want to do.”

Page 62, Lines 13-20
Judge: “Now, Mr. Reed, I don’t know whether consistent with the law and the application of the Speedy Trial Act that the rights of a defendant would be protected if a jury were impaneled and the actual prosecution of the case, the opening statements, and the submission of evidence were to follow at some relatively brief interval after that. You are sitting here with a understandable worried look, if not a scowl on your face, and I understand why and I’m concerned about that.

Page 75, Lines 3-8
Judge: “You can arrange for all subpoenas. I want the jury instructions that were previously agreed to, to make sure you make those available to Mr. Reed and I need a diskette, because I lost the one or we can’t find the one. There seems to be a goblin surrounding this case, and I want to fiddle with it so I would benefit from the diskette.

Docket # 224 on 09.24.2003 (SB)
09.24.2003 See Docket # 224. Request by Prosecutor, that defendant’s Standby Counsel be appointed to represent defendant.
Page 2, Lines 12-13
“It does not appear, however, that the Court advised defendant of the Nature of the charges.”

[The Ninth Court has refrained from requiring the district court to use a particular script when conducting an inquiry into whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel. See Hernandez, 203 F.3d at 623. Indeed, they have stated that the focus should be on what the defendant understood, rather than on what the court said or understood. See United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court's conversations with Sutcliffe at several hearings indicated that Sutcliffe didn’t understand the nature of charges for which he was to be tried. Sutcliffe repeatedly requested the court’s to explain and inform him. Instead of informing the defendant of the nature of the charges, the trial judge mocked the defendant, and then used this denial of the right as an excuse to have the defendant sent off for a competency examination.]

Transcript of 09.02.2003 (SB)
Docket # 193

Page 14, Lines 7-19
Defendant: “Thank you, Your Honor. One last objection. I do seek sanctions on Mr. Nicolaysen for failing to turn over that file as ordered. My concerns one, that man has threatened me in the past if I pressured him or made him look bad or forced him to do anything, go to court, he would make sure I lose. Now, he’s got my whole world in his hands, my whole world are in his hands right now in that file. All weekend he might be taking stuff. He might be loosing stuff, misplacing stuff. I don’t know. All I know [is] this man has threatened me in the past to make me lose this case. Now he’s ignoring everybody, doing his own thing. I want that noted for the record.”
Judge: “Okay. It is noted.”

Page 13, Lines 1-5
I believe I have the right to challenge the jurisdiction of those charges. It’s not personal towards this court, but It’s my understanding that a court which has lawful jurisdiction is a competent court. One, which lacks lawful jurisdiction, is an incompetent court.”

“I believe that this Court is proceeding as an incompetent court [if jurisdiction is proved] over me.

Page, 13, Lines 7-21
I have asked for it time and time again. I want that right. And I want notice any time I’m brought further into this courtroom. I don’t like being hailed into a court without any notice about what’s to take place. I wish this court to protect that right as well. Other then that, I proceed with all rights reserved until jurisdiction is proved.”
Judge: “Would you like to meet with Mr. Reed?”
Defendant: “As well as I do not recognize this court, I do not recognize - -“
So is it your choice not to have anything in the nature of even a preliminary conversation with Mr. Reed this afternoon?”
Defendant: “I believe I stated my objection very clearly.”

Page 12, Lines 17-25 to Page 13, Lines 1
Defendant:” Yes, Your Honor. First I’d like the record to reflect I am not proceeding pro per. If anything, I’ll be proceeding suri juris on my own right, not on my own behalf. I object to any other counsel being foisted over to me. I object to previous just removed counsel’s substituting a man on the spot as to be his replacement.” And I further object to this court not setting up a hearing forthwith to proffer its jurisdiction over the accused on these specific charges being transmitted in interstate commerce.”

Page 12, Lines 8-10
Judge: “But Mr. Sutcliffe is preceding in pro per so whether that leaves you in a difficult position remains to be seen in terms of trial preparation.

Page 11, Lines 3-6
Judge: “I am ordering the clerk, … to contact Mr. Nicolaysen and tell him that Reed is being substituted in place of Mr. Brennan. That’s my decision.”

Page 10, Lines 13-15
Judge: Mr. Brennan, did you get any parts of the file thus far from Mr. Nicolaysen?”
Defendant: “Neither have I, Your Honor.”

Page 10, Lines 3-7
Reed: “Well, that I’m not absolutely certain about.”
If the case is not too complex , then I certainly can be. There’s one month to go before that date approximately and I intend on studying the case, analyzing it. I would like, of course, to speak with Mr. Sutcliffe. ”

Page 10, Line 18
Defendant: “He has ignored the Court’s order.”

Pages 9-10, Page 9, Lines 22-25 to Page 10, Line 1
Judge: “Now, you understand as is inherent and understood I think by everyone in the concept of stand-by counsel that the role of stand-by counsel that the role of stand-by counsel sometimes can result in counsel becoming actual counsel by choice of the pro per client or for other reasons. Are you prepared to proceed with that understanding?”

Page 7, Lines14-16
Brennan: “I contacted Mr. Reed …and inquired about his possible availability to act as stand-by counsel.”
Page 7, Lines 4-8
Brennan: “For those reasons and based upon the fact that I was not able to fully explain these conflicts and problems to the court, I did file a written application asking the court to relieve me as stand-by counsel and requested that alternate stand-by counsel be appointed.”
Page 5, Lines 13-14
Brennan: “ Having realized my conflicts, I prepared an ex parte application explaining those in detail to the Court…”

Page 4, Lines 24-25
Brennan: “Michael Brennan, stand-by counsel for Mr. Sutcliffe”





(CENSORED 03.26.2023)

They all ignored their oaths, the facts, the rules, the laws, the 5th and 6th amendment and proceeded forward with a selective persecution in a secret hearing.

"Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented." -Elie Wiesel

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